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CASES NOTED
PROCEDURE - SUITS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT -
ANCILLARY LITIGATION
In a suit against the government for the proceeds of a National Service
Life Insurance policy,' the defendant brought in a party to whom several
payments had been made. Judgment was rendered for the plaintiff against
the government for the undisbursed proceeds2 and against the third party
for the payments made. Held, that the court has jurisdiction to compel
restitution from the party brought in by the government. De Motts v.
United States, 101 F. Supp. 770 (D. Kan. 1952).
From the basic nile that the government is not amenable to suit with-
out its consent,3 it has been held that such consent defines the jurisdiction
of the court hearing a permitted suit.4  Generally, a waiver of sovereign
immunity is to be strictly construed. 5 On these grounds, courts have usually
refused to expand suits against the government to entertain claims against
a third party not involving the government.6 The consent sued tinder in
the most important limiting decision7 impliedly involved an analogy to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims,8 where only the liability of the govern-
1. See the National Service Life Insurance Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 1008, as amended,
38 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (Supp. 1950). Such policies have now been generally replaced
during periods of active service for free protection. 65 STAT. 33 (1951), 38 U.S.C.A.
§ 851 et seq. (Supp. 1951) (Servicemen's Indemnity Act).
2. "Any payments of insurance made to a person represented by the insured to be
within the permitted class of beneficiaries shall be deemed to have been properly made
and to satisfy fully the obligation of the United States under such insurance policy to
the extent of such payments." 54 STAT. 1009 (1940), 38 U.S.C. § 802(1) (1946).
The third party, the insured's acknowledged mother, was within the permitted class
of beneficiaries.
3. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951); Maricopa County v. Valley
Nat. Bank, 318 U.S. 357 (1943); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941);
United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940).
4. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Herren v. Farm Security
Administration, 60 F. Supp. 694 (W.D. Ark. 1945) rev'd on other grounds, 153 F.2d 76
(8th Cir. 1946); North Side Canal Co. v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 12 F.2d 311 (D.
Idaho 1926).
5. McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25 (1951); United States v. Sherwood,
312 U.S. 584 (1941); United States v. Michel, 282 U.S. 656 (1931); Pass v. McGrath,
192 F.2d 415 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 72 Sup. Ct. 302 (1952). But see United
States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495, 501 (1940); cf. Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States,
324 U.S. 215 (1945); Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940).
6. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Pack v. United States, 176
F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949); \Wasserman v. Perugini, 173 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1949); Mor-
eno v. United States, 120 F.2d 128 (lst Cir. 1941), affirming 35 F. Supp. 657 (D.
Mass. 1940); Lowe v. United States, 37 F, Supp. 817 (D.N.J. 1941).
On whether jurisdiction over suits against the government can be invoked when the
real issue is between the plaintiff and a private co-defendant, compare Calhoun v. Ussery,
46 F.2d 495 (W.D. La. 1930) with New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. United States, 71
F. Supp. 155 (W.D. Pa. 1947). See Cramp Shipbuilding Co. v. United States, 20
U.S.L. \VEE K 2486 (3d Cir. April 7, 1952) (suit against the government failed, but
diversity of citizenship existed between the plaintiff and the co-defendant).
7. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
8. The district courts have concurrent jurisdiction not exceedig $10,000.00 with
the Court of Claims in certain suits against the United States, including those on "express
or implied contracts" and those "for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not
sounding in tort." 36 STAT. 1093 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 2401, 2402
(Supp. 1950).
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nient is held adjudicableYo Under certain other statutory waivers of immu-
nity, Court of Claims procedure has been held inapplicable.' 0
The National Service Life Insurance Act" expressly renders the govern-
nient susceptible to suit on policies issued under the Act' 2 and authorizes
"all parties having or claiming to have an interest in the insurance" to be
brought in. 5 Although it has been held that the latter provision is intended
to prevent Multiplicity of suits,'' and despite the possible inapplicability of
Court of Claims procedural limitations,'5 the courts have invoked the general
rule restricting litigation.' In suits under the Act, jurisdiction was refused
9. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941); Leather v. United States, 61
Ct. Cl. 388, cert. denied, 271 U.S. 660 (1926); Jackson v. United States, 27 Ct. Cl. 74(1891) (court cannot make private party a defendant, ". . . and if he should come in
voluntarily on notice the court would have no jurisdiction to make a decree to which it
could compel him to submit"); Waite v. United States, 57 Ct. Cl. 546 (1922) (govern-
inet contractor not permitted to intervene as defendant in patent infringement suit
although he was bound to save the government harmless from such suits); see United
States for Use of Mutual Metal Mfg. Co. v. Biggs, 46 F. Supp. 8, 11 (E.D. I1. 1942).
But cf. the Contract Settlement Act. 58 STAT. 633 (1944), 41 U.S.C. § 114(b), 114(c)(1946), Central Nat. Bank of Richmond v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 654 (Ct. Cl.
1949), 91 F. Supp. 738 (Ct. Cl. 1950).
10. United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547 (1921) (district court, given specialjurisdiction over claims against the government, not sitting as the Court of Claims);
Cook v. United States, 115 F.2d 463 (5th Cir. 1940) (general procedure must give way
to special provision for refunds of collections made by the Agricultural Adjustment Ad-
ministration); Westbrook v. Director General of Railroads, 263 Fed. 211 (N.D. Ga.
1920); see note 15 infra; cf. Revenue Oil Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 692 (1932),
cert. denied, 289 U.S. 728 (1933) (Secretary of the Interior's jurisdiction over land
c!aims excluded the Court of Claims).
11. See note I supra.
12. 43 S'rAT. 612 (1924), as amended, 38 U.S.C. § 445 (Supp. 1950), made applic-
able to the National Service Life Insurance Act by 54 STAT. 1014 (1940), as anended,
38 U.S.C. § 817 (1946). By § 817 as amended, § 445 seems applicable to the Service-
men's Indemnity Act, 65 STAr. 33 (1951), 38 U.S.C.A. § 851 et seq. (Supp. 1951).
13. Ibid.
14. Blanton v. United States, 17 F, Supp. 327, 329 (S.D. Ala. 1936); cf. Heinemann
v. Heinemann, 50 F.2d 696 (6th Cir. 1931) (the purpose of the provision is to effect a
consolidation of claims under the policy).
15. Law v. United States, 266 U.S. 494 (1925) (district court erroneously deniedjury trial under the general procedure when jury trial was available under the applicable
service insurance act); Prouty v. United States, 94 F. Supp. 320 (D.NI. 1950) (issue ofjury trial); cf. Mara v. United States, 54 F.2d 397 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (general consent to
be sued does not apply to service insurance actions); Iolliday v. United States, 87 F.
Supp. 367 (Ct. Cl. 1949) (Court of Claims cannot entertain suit for service insurance).
16. See notes 17, 18 infra.
Jurisdictional problems regarding venue and process are not discussed in the text,
since the objections of that class raised in the Do Motts case were termed unseasonable.
The opinions limiting litigation, infra notes 17, 18, seem to consider these problems im-
portant if not determinative. One writer suggests that the jurisdictional questions are
secondary to the larger issue of limiting litigation against the government. Chafee,
Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARv. L. REv. 929, 941-942(1943). It seems doubtful that this theory obtains when the decision is to expand the
suit. Both the court in the De Motts case and the dissenting judge in the Pack case,
infra note 18, apparently found it necessary to avoid the difficulties by holding the objec-
tions to venue to have been raised unseasonably.
The statutory provision for bringing in third parties, although it transcends ordinary
limits of venue and process, does not conflict with federal civil procedure. Frn. R. Civ.P. 4(f), 82. Unseasonable objections to venue may be ineffective. 62 STAT. 937 (1948),
63 STAT. 10t (1949), 28 U.S.C. § 1406 (Supp. 1950).
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over ancillary actions for alienation of affections 7 and for enforcement of
community property rights.1 8
Pointing out that the cross-action in the instant case arose from the
same contract of insurance as the principal action, the court distinguished
the prior holdings."' Federal third-party practice was considered, 20 but the
third party's pleadings were held to have joined the issues as in an inter-
pleader. 2' It was apparently assumed that in an interpleader the court would
have the disputed jurisdiction.
The general restriction on litigation against the government was not
reasoned away, nor is it likely that the asserted jurisdiction can be founded
on an analogy to interpleader.2 2 Rather, it is submitted, construction of the
17. Moreno v. United States, 120 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1941), affirming 35 F. Snpp.
657 (D. Mass. 1940). See Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader,
56 HARV. L. REV. 929, 939-942, 957-958.
18. Pack v. United States, 176 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949). This case seems to
achieve the unfortunate effect of denying relief to a woman whose husband used their
community property without her consent to create an insurance estate payable to a third
party. Whereas the Pack case dealt with procedure, it has since been held.that a widow
is without substantive rights in such a situation. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655(1950), reversing 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201 P.2d 837 (1949) (the deceased's wishes re-
garding the service life insurance proceeds override the community property rights of his
wife in the insurance estate).
19. De Motts v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 770, 772-773 (D. Kan. 1952).
20. Federal third-party practice, FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a), is probably inapplicable.
Moreno v. United States, 120 F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1941), affirming 35 F. Supp. 657 (D.
Mass. 1940); Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56 HARV. L.
REV. 929, 957-958 (1943). Furthermore, Rule 14(a) has been modified since the
Moreno case and Chafee's article to exclude parties brought in oi account of possible
liability to the plaintiff. Compare 329 U.S. 843, 852 with 308 U.S. 645, 681-682.
Rule 13(g) is discussed in note 22 infra.
21. The third party entered a cross-complaint for all the proceeds. \Vith her reply,
the plaintiff filed a cross-complaint against the third party for the payments made.
22. Federal interpleader proceedings are generally limited to claims against the res.
Pack v. United States, 176 F.2d 770 (9th Cir. 1949); Moreno v. United States, 120
F.2d 128 (1st Cir. 1941); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Tomes, 45 F. Supp. 353 (D. Neb. 1942);
Lawyers Trust Co. v. W,. G. Maguire & Co., 2 F.R.D. 310 (D. Del. 1942); Stitzel-Weller
Distillery, Inc. v. Norman, 39 F. Supp. 182 (,V.D. Ky. 1941); Massachusetts Bonding &
Ins. Co. v. Daniels, 35 .F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Ill. 1941); accord, Great Lakes Auto Ins.
Group v. Shepherd, 95 F. Stpp. 1 (V.D. Ark. 1951) (cross-claim not allowed against a
defendant who made no claim); of. Hagan v. Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., 180 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1950) (cross-claim not allowed against an absentee defendant); West Coast
Life Iris. Co. v. Twogood, 83 F. Supp. 710 (S.D. Cal. 1949). Contra: Coastal Air Lines,
Inc. v. Dockery, I80 F.2d 874 (Sth Cir 1950); Bank of Neosho v. Colcord, 8 F.R.D. 621(W.D. Mo. 1949); Chafee, Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader, 56
IIARv. L. REV. 929 (1943); cf. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Puget Sound Co., 154 F.2d 249
(2d Cir. 1946) (restitution possible in same suit for amount paid out under incorrect
decision of lower court); Century Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 F.2d 726 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 308 U.S. 570 (1939) (decree granting entire fire insurance proceeds to
trustee of bankrupt warehouseman as against holders of warehouse receipts reduced to
amount of lien for storage); Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F.2d 277 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 303 U.S. 660 (1938) (court may determine if there was fraud in
assignment to assignee-claimant).
Coastal Air Lines, Inc. v. Dockery, supra, and Bank of Neosho v. Coleord, sn/ira, in
admitting ancillary litigation, invoked Rule 13(g) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, which rule applies to a cross-claim against a co-party. A party brought in to assert
his interest in service life insurance would not seem to be a "co-party" in regard to the
plaintiff in a suit against the government.
Interpleader proceedings initiated by the government in service life insurance cases
should not be expanded. Chafee, supra, at 939-942.
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procedural provisions of the service insurance act, as well as of the substan-
tive provisions, should be guided by the deceased's intent.2 3  That intent
has been held powerful enough to controvert rights established by state
law; 24 and, as mentioned before, special procedure may obtain under partic-
ular waivers of governmental immunity.25 Actually, the prior cases as well
as the instant case entertain those matters essential in carrying out the
serviceman's intent, but nowhere do the opinions acknowledge that intent
to be controlling.
TAXATION - MOVABLE TANGIBLES - TAXING SITUS
Plaintiff's interstate barges were registered in Ohio, but stopped there
only for fuel and repairs. Ohio levied an ad valorem personal property tax
on the full value of the vessels. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the
United States, held, that the possibility of subjection to a second tax by the
states in which the barges have acquired taxing sitii through physical pres-
ence' precludes collection by the domiciliary state of more than its propor-
tionate share. Standard Oil Co. v. Peck, 72 Sup. Ct. 309 (1952).
Since the establishment of federal supremacy over navigable waters,2 ill
order to protect shipping against multiple taxation3 the courts have had to
decide what constitutes a tax situs for vessels.4 A state may tax tangible
personal property found within its borders, " even against a domiciliary of
another state.0  However, a distinguishable situation arises where the prop-
23. See Thomas v. United States, 189 F.2d 494 (6th Cir.), cert, denied, 342 U.S.
850 (1951); Johnson v. United States, 87 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1937); Golden v. United
States, 91 F. Supp. 950 (M.D. Ala. 1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1951); Jadin v.
United States, 74 F. Supp. 589 (D. Wis. 1947); Baldwin v. United States, 68 F. Supp.
657 ('W.D. Mo. 1946).
24. Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950), reversing 89 Cal. App. 2d 759, 201
P.2d 837 (1949).
25. See notes 10, 15 supra.
1. Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
2. United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940); Gibbons v.
Ogden, 9 Wheat, I (U.S. 1824).
3. U.S. Consr. AMEND. XIV, § 1; Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473 (1925);
Delaware, L. & W. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 198 U.S. 341 (1905); Union Refrigerator
Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
4. Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473
(1925) (not applicable to intangibles, although in Texas v. Florida the Supreme Court
took it upon itself to determine a domicile from the evidence in the record).
5. Pullman's Palace-Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); WValworth v.
Harris, 129 U.S. 355 (1888).
6. Old Dominion S.S. Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905); Pullman's Palace.Car
Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886); Brown v.
Houston, 114 U.S. 622 (1884); The State Railroad Tax Cases, 92 U.S. 575 (1875);
Tappan v. Merchant's Bank, 19 Wall. 490 (U.S. 1873); Railroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 15
Wall. 300 (U.S. 1868).
